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The Many Moral Rationalisms$
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Karen Jones and François Schroeter

Print publication date: 2018

Print ISBN-13: 9780198797074

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: July 2018

DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198797074.001.0001

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PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2021. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 14 May 2021

Reasons and Justifiability

Reasons and Justifiability

Chapter:
(p.145) 7 Reasons and Justifiability
Source:
The Many Moral Rationalisms
Author(s):

Laura Schroeter

François Schroeter

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/oso/9780198797074.003.0007

This chapter sketches a metasemantic model that promises to vindicate a broadly rationalist version of normative realism. It introduces a metasemantic principle that ties reference determination to what is justifiable from the perspective of the conceptually competent subject. The chapter explains how this metasemantic principle can help vindicate something close to the traditional rationalist claim that normative truths can be known a priori. It then shows how an anti-individualist version of this metasemantic principle can handle the problem of radical disagreement among competent speakers. The last part of the paper explains how our metasemantic model can help vindicate the traditional rationalist thesis that moral requirements entail valid reasons for action.

Keywords:   moral rationalism, normative realism, a priority, metasemantics, anti-individualism, moral disagreement, reasons for action

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