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Knowledge, Belief, and GodNew Insights in Religious Epistemology$
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Matthew A. Benton, John Hawthorne, and Dani Rabinowitz

Print publication date: 2018

Print ISBN-13: 9780198798705

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: March 2018

DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198798705.001.0001

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PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2021. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 16 October 2021

Phenomenal Conservatism and Religious Experience

Phenomenal Conservatism and Religious Experience

(p.322) 16 Phenomenal Conservatism and Religious Experience
Knowledge, Belief, and God

Richard Swinburne

Oxford University Press

Phenomenal conservativism in epistemology is a view which endorses the principle of credulity: namely, the principle that every belief with which a person finds himself is a justified belief (one which the believer is justified in having) in the absence of any evidence that the belief is false (which might take the form of evidence that the belief has been produced by an unreliable process). This chapter investigates the senses of ‘belief’, ‘justified’, and ‘evidence’ on which this doctrine is true, and the senses in which it is false. It concentrates in particular on the many different senses in which a belief can be said to be ‘justified’ or ‘rational’; and it applies these results to religious claims concerning religious experience.

Keywords:   religious experience, phenomenal conservatism, perceptual seemings, principle of credulity, epistemic conservatism

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