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Meaning DiminishedToward Metaphysically Modest Semantics$
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Kenneth A. Taylor

Print publication date: 2019

Print ISBN-13: 9780198803447

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2019

DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198803447.001.0001

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The Way of Ideas and the Way of Reference

The Way of Ideas and the Way of Reference

Chapter:
(p.38) 3 The Way of Ideas and the Way of Reference
Source:
(p.iii) Meaning Diminished
Author(s):

Kenneth A. Taylor

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/oso/9780198803447.003.0003

In the current chapter, I consider two competing metasemantic outlooks and their consequences for the metaphysical modesty or immodesty of first order semantic analysis. The two metasemantic approaches are rooted in what I call referential semantics and what I call ideational semantics. The foundational assumptions of referential metasemantics and ideational metasemantics are outlined with a focus on how each approach attempts to solve the determination problem. It is argued that different approaches to the determination problem lead to two different approaches to the metaphysics of the assigned semantic values. Finally, the way of ideas in metaphysics is distinguished from the way of reference in metaphysics.

Keywords:   determination problem, way of ideas, way of reference, semantic fundamentals, presentationalism, representing, representing as, metaphysics, semantic fundamentals, semantic value

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