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Meaning DiminishedToward Metaphysically Modest Semantics$
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Kenneth A. Taylor

Print publication date: 2019

Print ISBN-13: 9780198803447

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2019

DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198803447.001.0001

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Some Considerations against the Way of Ideas

Some Considerations against the Way of Ideas

(p.76) 4 Some Considerations against the Way of Ideas
Meaning Diminished

Kenneth A. Taylor

Oxford University Press

In this chapter, I offer some considerations against the way of ideas. I do not claim that these considerations are ultimately decisive against all version of the way of ideas. Three different version of the way of ideas in metaphysics are presented and assessed, including Kant’s transcendental idealism, Frege’s aspirational Platonism, and Strawson descriptive metaphysics. Though none of the three is decisively refuted, some shortcomings of each are demonstrated. These shortcomings motivate a turn away from the way of ideas in metaphysics and toward the way of reference in metaphysics.

Keywords:   Kant, Frege, Strawson, Carnap, way of ideas, transcendental idealism, idealism, deflationary metaphysics

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