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AcquaintanceNew Essays$
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Jonathan Knowles and Thomas Raleigh

Print publication date: 2019

Print ISBN-13: 9780198803461

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: December 2019

DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198803461.001.0001

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PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2021. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 20 January 2022

Acquaintance Is Consciousness and Consciousness Is Acquaintance

Acquaintance Is Consciousness and Consciousness Is Acquaintance

(p.33) 1 Acquaintance Is Consciousness and Consciousness Is Acquaintance

Joseph Levine

Oxford University Press

In this chapter I survey the various roles that acquaintance might play in the philosophy of language, epistemology, and philosophy of mind, and I then go on to explore the prospects for a naturalistic account of acquaintance to fill these roles. I will continue by arguing that while some roles can be filled by a naturalistic theory, others cannot. Finally, I will briefly present a non-naturalistic theory, according to which consciousness just is the relation of acquaintance, and show both how it accomplishes what a naturalistic theory could not but also how it cannot accomplish everything a naturalistic theory can.

Keywords:   objectual knowledge, naturalism, intentionality, demonstrative(s), the Given, cognitive immediacy, primitive relation

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