Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility Volume 4$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

David Shoemaker

Print publication date: 2017

Print ISBN-13: 9780198805601

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: August 2017

DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198805601.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2020. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 22 October 2020

Implicit Bias, Responsibility, and Moral Ecology

Implicit Bias, Responsibility, and Moral Ecology

(p.219) 11 Implicit Bias, Responsibility, and Moral Ecology
Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility Volume 4

Manuel R. Vargas

Oxford University Press

There are reasons that weigh both in favor and against judging agents blameworthy for actions produced in part by implicit biases. Indeed, perhaps implicit bias reveals that our received views about agency are mistaken or confused. If so, then perhaps implicit bias is not merely some further phenomenon to which we can apply our pre-existing theories of moral responsibility and agency, but instead, a kind of challenge to those theories. This essay argues that there is an appealing way of thinking about the blameworthiness of actions caused by implicit bias that allows us to accommodate some of the radical aspects of the emerging scientific picture of agency, without entirely abandoning our commonsense picture of agency. The key is to recognize how a roughly “ecological” conception of moral agency can provide us with principled resources for distinguishing when agents are in circumstances that afford responsibility, and when they are not.

Keywords:   implicit bias, moral responsibility, moral ecology, agency, moral psychology, blame, responsibility, capacities

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .