The Embodied versus Embedded Versions of Expertise
The Embodied versus Embedded Versions of Expertise
Revisiting the Dreyfus–Collins Debate
There is a long and unsettled debate between Hubert Dreyfus and Harry Collins regarding embodiment and its connection to expertise. On the one hand, Dreyfus—as an existentialist philosopher—puts emphasis on the phenomenological aspects of the human body and its implications. On the other hand, Collins—as a sociologist of scientific knowledge—stresses the sociological aspects underlying human expertise. To Collins, Dreyfus’ phenomenology is “asociological” while to Dreyfus, Collins’ sociology is phenomenologically “disembodied.” The purpose of this chapter is to disentangle the differences between the two positions and offer a solution to the debate. To this end, the author analyzes the attempt of automating human perceptual skill in industry through a “case study”: the automation of a ball mill. If automation is successful in replacing human beings and their bodies, the sociological view is correct and the phenomenological is wrong—and vice versa.
Keywords: embodiment, synchronization, expertise, human perception, artificial intelligence, automation of skills
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