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In the Light of ExperienceNew Essays on Perception and Reasons$
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Johan Gersel, Rasmus Thybo Jensen, Morten S. Thaning, and Søren Overgaard

Print publication date: 2018

Print ISBN-13: 9780198809630

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: July 2018

DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198809630.001.0001

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PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2020. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 29 November 2020

Fallibility for Infallibilists

Fallibility for Infallibilists

(p.161) 6 Fallibility for Infallibilists
In the Light of Experience

Jason Leddington

Oxford University Press

Infallibilism is the view that knowledge requires conclusive grounds. Despite its intuitive appeal, most contemporary epistemology rejects Infallibilism; however, there is a strong minority tradition that embraces it. Showing that Infallibilism is viable requires showing that it is compatible with the undeniable fact that we can go wrong in pursuit of perceptual knowledge. In other words, we need an account of fallibility for Infallibilists. By critically examining John McDowell’s recent attempt at such an account, this paper articulates a very important general lesson for Infallibilists. The paper concludes by briefly discussing two ways to do justice to this lesson, and so, two possible approaches to fallibility for Infallibilists: first, at the level of experience; and second, at the level of judgment.

Keywords:   perceptual knowledge, infallibilism, fallibility, capacities, experience, judgment, John McDowell, Tyler Burge, Charles Travis

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