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Self-Consciousness and "Split" BrainsThe Minds' I$
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Elizabeth Schechter

Print publication date: 2018

Print ISBN-13: 9780198809654

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: June 2018

DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198809654.001.0001

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PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2021. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 30 July 2021

How Many Minds?

How Many Minds?

Chapter:
(p.80) 4 How Many Minds?
Source:
Self-Consciousness and "Split" Brains
Author(s):

Elizabeth Schechter

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/oso/9780198809654.003.0004

The previous chapters argued that within a split-brain subject there are two subjects of conscious experience and intentional agents, R and L. This chapter explains who these two thinking beings are and how it is possible for two thinkers to be co-embodied. The basis of the 2-thinkers claim is, naturally, that R and L think, feel, decide, and so on, independently of each other. Of course, this does not mean that they do not causally interact; since they are co-embodied, they interact all the time. What split-brain experiments show, however, is that R’s mental activities interact with L’s largely only indirectly: one of them acts or reacts in some way, and the other senses or perceives this re/action. Mental activities are causal activities whose psychological kinds are defined by their powers to interact directly. Thus the thinking things in the split-brain case are R and L, and only derivatively S.

Keywords:   minds, personal identity, individuation, psychology, split-brain

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