Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Self-Consciousness and "Split" BrainsThe Minds' I$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

Elizabeth Schechter

Print publication date: 2018

Print ISBN-13: 9780198809654

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: June 2018

DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198809654.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2021. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 27 July 2021

Objection from Sub-Cortical Structures

Objection from Sub-Cortical Structures

(p.107) 5 Objection from Sub-Cortical Structures
Self-Consciousness and "Split" Brains

Elizabeth Schechter

Oxford University Press

This chapter explains and responds to the major objection to the duality claims, the objection from sub-cortical structures. What gives rise to the duality intuition is that, after split-brain surgery, mental state interaction appears to operate oddly indirectly—when the mental states in question are in opposite hemispheres. Nonetheless, interhemispheric mental interaction is not entirely indirect, that is, not exclusively mediated by sensation/perception and re/action. According to the objection from sub-cortical structures, remaining direct interhemispheric interaction is substantial enough to support the 1-thinker claim over the 2-thinkers claim. I argue instead that remaining direct interhemispheric interaction is not so substantial, and that what remaining direct interhemispheric interaction there is remains consistent with the 2-thinkers claim that the rest of the data support. R and L are thus not discrete but still distinct thinkers.

Keywords:   minds, psychology, mental tokens, neuroanatomy, neuroplasticity, conjoined twins

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .