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Self-Consciousness and "Split" BrainsThe Minds' I$
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Elizabeth Schechter

Print publication date: 2018

Print ISBN-13: 9780198809654

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: June 2018

DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198809654.001.0001

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PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2021. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 25 July 2021

The Self-Consciousness Condition of Personhood

The Self-Consciousness Condition of Personhood

Chapter:
(p.181) 8 The Self-Consciousness Condition of Personhood
Source:
Self-Consciousness and "Split" Brains
Author(s):

Elizabeth Schechter

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/oso/9780198809654.003.0008

This chapter argues that the capacity for first-personal self-distinction is a condition of personhood. R and L lack the capacity to first-personally distinguish themselves from each other. On the other hand, they possess the capacity to first-personally distinguish S from everything else. This means that it is not R and L as R and L, but rather the two together, as S, that meets this condition of personhood. Because the capacity for self-distinction is so basic, this in turn affects how R and L exercise many of their other personal capacities. Indeed, they cannot relate to themselves or to other people as distinct persons, but only as (parts of) one person, S. This both evokes and supports the unity intuition, according to which S is indeed one of us.

Keywords:   norms, normative agency, sociality, conditions of personhood, personal capacities

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