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Bernard BolzanoHis Life and Work$
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Paul Rusnock and Jan Sebestík

Print publication date: 2019

Print ISBN-13: 9780198823681

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: June 2019

DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198823681.001.0001

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PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2021. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 30 November 2021

Theory of Knowledge

Theory of Knowledge

Chapter:
(p.337) Chapter 7 Theory of Knowledge
Source:
Bernard Bolzano
Author(s):

Paul Rusnock

Jan Šebestík

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/oso/9780198823681.003.0008

This chapter presents Bolzano’s theory of knowledge, focusing on the account given in Book 3 of the Theory of Science. It begins with an introduction situating Bolzano in the historical context of modern philosophy and highlighting some of the most innovative features of his epistemology. There follows a section laying out the elements of Bolzano’s account of human knowledge: the nature of subjective ideas and propositions, their relations to their objective counterparts, intuitions and concepts, inference, immediate judgments, a priori and empirical knowledge. It then discusses his notions of knowledge, error, and certainty, followed by a consideration of §303 of the Theory of Science, where Bolzano describes how we might come to form some of our most basic judgments of experience. A final section discusses Bolzano’s critical stance towards the Kantian philosophy.

Keywords:   knowledge, cognition, judgment, idea, probability, error, a priori, Kant, inference

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