Epistemic insouciance is an epistemic vice that takes the form of an affective epistemic posture. Epistemic insouciance is the epistemic vice behind bullshit in Harry Frankfurt’s sense. Epistemic insouciance, which consists in a casual lack of concern about whether one’s beliefs have any basis in reality or adequate evidential support, is different from epistemic malevolence. The latter is a voluntarily adopted epistemic stance rather than an affective posture. Epistemic malevolence, defined by Jason Baehr as opposition to knowledge as such or to another person’s share of knowledge, is illustrated by reference to what Naomi Oreskes and Erik Conway refer to as the ‘tobacco strategy’.
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