Stealthy vices, such as closed-mindedness, are epistemic vices that are inherently hard to detect because it is in their nature to block their own detection. This chapter defends the view that at least some epistemic vices are stealthy and some are stealthier than others. The stealthiness of stealthy vices is explained on the basis that such vices negate or nullify the epistemic virtues on which active critical reflection on one’s own vices depends. The stealthiness of stealthy vices is the vice epistemological analogue of the Dunning-Kruger effect, but traumatic experiences can sometimes open one’s eyes to one’s own epistemic vices. In such cases one acquires self-knowledge by transformational insight rather than by active critical reflection.
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