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Conditionality & Coercion – Electoral clientelism in Eastern Europe - Oxford Scholarship Online
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Conditionality & Coercion: Electoral clientelism in Eastern Europe

Isabela Mares and Lauren E. Young

Abstract

In many recent democracies, candidates compete for office using illegal strategies to influence voters. In Hungary and Romania, local actors including mayors and bureaucrats offer access to social policy benefits to voters who offer to support their preferred candidates, and they threaten others with the loss of a range of policy and private benefits for voting the “wrong” way. These quid pro quo exchanges are often called clientelism. How can politicians and their accomplices get away with such illegal campaigning in otherwise democratic, competitive elections? When do they rely on the worst ... More

Keywords: clientelism, corruption, Eastern Europe, elections, electoral coercion, social policy, brokers, local politics, vote buying, Hungary, Romania

Bibliographic Information

Print publication date: 2019 Print ISBN-13: 9780198832775
Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2019 DOI:10.1093/oso/9780198832775.001.0001

Authors

Affiliations are at time of print publication.

Isabela Mares, author
Professor of Political Science, Yale University

Lauren E. Young, author
Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of California Davis