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Oxford Studies in Epistemology Volume 6$
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Tamar Szabó Gendler and John Hawthorne

Print publication date: 2019

Print ISBN-13: 9780198833314

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: March 2019

DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198833314.001.0001

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PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2022. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use.date: 01 July 2022

Clarifying Pragmatic Encroachment

Clarifying Pragmatic Encroachment

A Reply to Charity Anderson and John Hawthorne on Knowledge, Practical Adequacy, and Stakes

Chapter:
(p.258) 11. Clarifying Pragmatic Encroachment
Source:
Oxford Studies in Epistemology Volume 6
Author(s):

Jeremy Fantl

Matthew McGrath

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/oso/9780198833314.003.0011

This chapter addresses concerns that pragmatic encroachers are committed to problematic knowledge variance. It first replies to Charity Anderson and John Hawthorne’s new putative problem cases, which purport to show that pragmatic encroachment is committed to problematic variations in knowledge depending on what choices are available to the potential knower. It argues that the new cases do not provide any new reasons to be concerned about the pragmatic encroacher’s commitment to knowledge-variance. The chapter further argues that concerns about knowledge-variance are not limited to the pragmatic encroacher, but come up for traditional purist invariantism as well.

Keywords:   pragmatic encroachment, knowledge, invariantism, stake, practical reason, purism

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