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Oxford Studies in Epistemology Volume 6$
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Tamar Szabó Gendler and John Hawthorne

Print publication date: 2019

Print ISBN-13: 9780198833314

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: March 2019

DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198833314.001.0001

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Accuracy and Educated Guesses

Accuracy and Educated Guesses

(p.85) 4. Accuracy and Educated Guesses
Oxford Studies in Epistemology Volume 6

Sophie Horowitz

Oxford University Press

Credences, unlike full beliefs, can’t be true or false. So what makes credences more or less accurate? This chapter offers a new answer to this question: credences are accurate insofar as they license true educated guesses, and less accurate insofar as they license false educated guesses. This account is compatible with immodesty; : a rational agent will regard her own credences to be best for the purposes of making true educated guesses. The guessing account can also be used to justify certain coherence constraints on rational credence, such as probabilism. The chapter concludes by discussing some advantages of the guessing account over rival accounts of accuracy.

Keywords:   accuracy, credence, guess, rationality, immodesty, probabilism

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