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The Primacy of Metaphysics$
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Christopher Peacocke

Print publication date: 2019

Print ISBN-13: 9780198835578

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: July 2019

DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198835578.001.0001

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Conclusion

Conclusion

Avenues for Further Development

Chapter:
(p.204) 7 Conclusion
Source:
The Primacy of Metaphysics
Author(s):

Christopher Peacocke

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/oso/9780198835578.003.0007

The account of the relation between metaphysics and the theory of content suggests further investigation in four areas: the acquisition of concepts; the detailed accounting of what is involved in possession and acquisition in no-priority cases; the wider application, to other areas, of the principle that Individuation Precedes Representation; and the integration of a metaphysics-involving account of concept possession into the general task of integrating the epistemology and metaphysics of a domain. This concluding chapter looks at the connection between the claims of this book and further possible directions of investigation.

Keywords:   acquisition of concepts, no-priority cases, Individuation Precedes Representation, integration of epistemology and metaphysics

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