Territorial Cleavages and Constitutional Transitions
Territorial Cleavages and Constitutional Transitions
Political Mobilization, Constitution-Making Processes, and Constitutional Design
This chapter explores how patterns of territorial political mobilization influence the processes of Constitution-making and the choices of constitutional design, focusing on seventeen countries that differ significantly in the structure of their politically salient territorial cleavages. The seventeen cases present relatively recent examples of constitutional transitions. The chapter first examines what it calls “constitutional moments” and three contextual variables that shape their structure and dynamics: the political geometry of territorial cleavages, the means to pursue claims for territorial accommodation, and the relative power positions of political actors. The chapter then considers the context and dynamics of constitutional moments, three stages of Constitution-making processes (agenda setting, deliberation, ratification), and three major constitutional design options to respond to claims for territorial accommodation (symmetrical federalism or devolution with a majoritarian central government, highly devolved federalism with a consociational central government, special autonomy for small territories, and a majoritarian central government).
Keywords: political mobilization, Constitution-making, constitutional design, territorial cleavage, constitutional transition, constitutional moments, political geometry, federalism, devolution, special autonomy
Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.
Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.
If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.
To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .
