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Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Language Volume 1$
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Ernie Lepore and David Sosa

Print publication date: 2019

Print ISBN-13: 9780198836568

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: April 2019

DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198836568.001.0001

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PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2021. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 24 January 2022

Truth

Truth

Chapter:
(p.148) 6 Truth
Source:
Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Language Volume 1
Author(s):

Ian Rumfitt

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/oso/9780198836568.003.0006

P. F. Strawson explained truth, as it applies to statements, by saying: ‘one who makes a statement or assertion makes a true statement if and only if things are as, in making the statement, he states them to be’. This explanation differs from others in taking a statement’s having a content (i.e. its saying that things are thus-and-so) to be a presupposition of an attribution of truth to it. This paper shows how this feature opens the way to a distinctive solution to the Liar Paradox and to a foundation for the axiomatic theories of truth now favoured by many logicians.

Keywords:   truth, Liar Paradox, partial logic, intensional logic, presupposition, P. F. Strawson, Kripke-Feferman

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