Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Reasons, Justification, and Defeat$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

Jessica Brown and Mona Simion

Print publication date: 2021

Print ISBN-13: 9780198847205

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: April 2021

DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198847205.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2021. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 05 August 2021

Reasons for Reliabilism

Reasons for Reliabilism

(p.146) 7 Reasons for Reliabilism
Reasons, Justification, and Defeat

Bob Beddor

Oxford University Press

One leading approach to justification comes from the reliabilist tradition, which maintains that a belief is justified provided that it is reliably formed. Another comes from the ‘Reasons First’ tradition, which claims that a belief is justified provided that it is based on reasons that support it. These two approaches are typically developed in isolation from each other; this essay motivates and defends a synthesis. On the view proposed here, justification is understood in terms of an agent’s reasons for belief, which are in turn analysed along reliabilist lines: an agent’s reasons for belief are the states that serve as inputs to their reliable processes. I show that this synthesis allows each tradition to profit from the other’s explanatory resources. In particular, it enables reliabilists to explain epistemic defeat without abandoning their naturalistic ambitions. I go on to compare my proposed synthesis with other hybrid versions of reliabilism that have been proposed in the literature.

Keywords:   justification, reliabilism, reasons, synthesis, naturalism

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .