Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Oxford Studies in Experimental Philosophy Volume 3$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

Tania Lombrozo, Joshua Knobe, and Shaun Nichols

Print publication date: 2020

Print ISBN-13: 9780198852407

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2020

DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198852407.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2021. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 05 August 2021

The Subscript View

The Subscript View

A Distinct View of Distinct Selves

Chapter:
(p.126) 5 The Subscript View
Source:
Oxford Studies in Experimental Philosophy Volume 3
Author(s):

Hannah Tierney

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/oso/9780198852407.003.0006

Pluralism about personal identity has been understudied and underdeveloped in the literature. It merits greater attention, especially in light of recent work by philosophers and psychologists, which illuminates the great number of our evaluative practices that presuppose personal identity. It is unlikely that traditional monistic approaches to personal identity can ground or explain all of these practices and concerns. If philosophical theories are taken to be saying anything about the commonsense conception of personal identity, then this empirical work ought to be taken seriously. Chapter 5 proposes the author’s own pluralist account of personal identity—the Subscript View. On this view, there typically exist (at least) two individuals whenever it was once thought there was only one, a psychological individual (selfp) and a biological individual (selfb). According to Tierney, the Subscript View can better account for many identity-related practical concerns than traditional monistic approaches to persistence.

Keywords:   personal identity, pluralism, psychological continuity, biological continuity, ambiguous loss

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .