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Prejudice – A Study in Non-Ideal Epistemology - Oxford Scholarship Online
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Prejudice: A Study in Non-Ideal Epistemology

Endre Begby

Abstract

Prejudiced beliefs may certainly seem like defective beliefs. But in what sense defective? No doubt, many of them will be false. Some will also be harmful. But many philosophers further argue that prejudiced belief is defective also in the sense that it could only arise from distinctive kinds of epistemic irrationality: we could acquire or retain our prejudiced beliefs only by culpably violating our epistemic responsibilities. Moreover, it is assumed that we are morally responsible for the harms that our prejudiced beliefs cause only because, in forming these beliefs in the first place, we are ... More

Keywords: prejudice, epistemology, social epistemology, non-ideal epistemology, epistemic constraints on moral responsibility

Bibliographic Information

Print publication date: 2021 Print ISBN-13: 9780198852834
Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: March 2021 DOI:10.1093/oso/9780198852834.001.0001

Authors

Affiliations are at time of print publication.

Endre Begby, author
Associate Professor of Philosophy, Simon Fraser University