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Oxford Studies in Metaethics Volume 15$
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Russ Shafer-Landau

Print publication date: 2020

Print ISBN-13: 9780198859512

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: August 2020

DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198859512.001.0001

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PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2021. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 24 October 2021

Group Agency Meets Metaethics

Group Agency Meets Metaethics

How to Craft a More Compelling Form of Normative Relativism

(p.219) 10 Group Agency Meets Metaethics
Oxford Studies in Metaethics Volume 15

Michelle M. Dyke

Oxford University Press

The author argues that well-known forms of relativism are unable to accommodate, at once, a set of three highly intuitive theses about the distinctive character of moral reasons. Yet the author argues it is possible to formulate a novel form of normative relativism that has the power to accommodate these claims. The proposed view combines the relativist idea that the normative facts are attitude-dependent with the insight that there are non-human agents to which it makes sense to attribute the kinds of attitudes that give rise to normative reasons. Societies, too, can possess reasons to pursue their aims. What distinguishes moral reasons from reasons of practical rationality is that the former apply directly to societies in virtue of aims held by each society as a group, while the latter apply directly to persons in light of their own individual interests.

Keywords:   moral relativism, realism, antirealism, normative reasons, group agency

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