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Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics Volume 10$
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Mark Timmons

Print publication date: 2020

Print ISBN-13: 9780198867944

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2020

DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198867944.001.0001

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PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2021. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 27 November 2021

Manifestations of Virtue

Manifestations of Virtue

(p.229) 10 Manifestations of Virtue
Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics Volume 10

Arden Ali

Oxford University Press

Few philosophers endorse a virtue theory of praiseworthiness. The widespread aversion to any virtue theory of moral worth rests chiefly on a skeptical argument that emphasizes the fact that praiseworthy acts can be performed by people who lack the relevant virtue. This chapter studies this skeptical argument closely. The response from virtue theorists has been to reject the premise of the argument by denying that someone can be fully praiseworthy for an act without possessing the relevant virtue. This chapter claims that this reply is unlikely to succeed. In its place, it argues that the skeptic’s core premise has been misleadingly characterized and used to conceal a questionable inference. The chapter concludes that it is possible for the virtue theory of praiseworthiness to escape the grip of the skeptical argument.

Keywords:   virtue ethics, moral worth, praiseworthiness, virtue, motivating reasons, moral motivation

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