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The Explainability of ExperienceRealism and Subjectivity in Spinoza's Theory of the Human Mind$
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Ursula Renz

Print publication date: 2018

Print ISBN-13: 9780199350162

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: July 2018

DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780199350162.001.0001

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PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2021. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 30 November 2021

Panpsychism, or the Question “What Is the Subject of Experience?”

Panpsychism, or the Question “What Is the Subject of Experience?”

Chapter:
(p.168) 11 Panpsychism, or the Question “What Is the Subject of Experience?”
Source:
The Explainability of Experience
Author(s):

Ursula Renz

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/oso/9780199350162.003.0012

This chapter discusses the issue of Spinoza’s so-called panpsychism, which is the view, often ascribed to him, that all entities are endowed with minds. In particular, the chapter takes a closer look at the scholium following 2p13, which is usually taken as the textual evidence for this reading. In contrast to the panpsychist interpretation, the chapter shows that, by claiming universal animation, Spinoza does not intend to ascribe minds to all and every being. Instead, the chapter suggests reading his claim as maintaining that rationalism holds throughout the universe or, in other words, that intelligibility applies to all beings without any gap.

Keywords:   aptitude, capacity, panpsychism, rationalism, animation, mind, parallelism

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