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The Philosophy of Daniel Dennett$
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Bryce Huebner

Print publication date: 2018

Print ISBN-13: 9780199367511

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: February 2018

DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780199367511.001.0001

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PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2021. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 03 March 2021

The Many Roles of the Intentional Stance

The Many Roles of the Intentional Stance

(p.36) 2.1 The Many Roles of the Intentional Stance
The Philosophy of Daniel Dennett

Tadeusz Zawidzki

Oxford University Press

Can the intentional stance play all of the roles Dennett claims that it must play? There is reason for skepticism about the suitability of the intentional stance as an analysis of mature, person-level, intentional concepts. In part this is because of the dynamic and socially situated structure of our interpersonal practices. In part this is because folk-ascriptions of mentality are often guided by regulative concerns with impression management and identity construction. But scientific practice often relies on intentional states that are characterized in terms of their predictive and explanatory roles; and most humans employ tacit cognitive resources with a similar character when they make quick and efficient behavioral anticipations. In light of these considerations, it is unlikely a single set of explanatory norms will be operative in practices of quotidian interpretation, scientific explanation, and philosophical naturalization.

Keywords:   intentional stance, explanatory norms, folk psychology, mindshaping, Daniel Dennett

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