Chapter 3’s distinction between the world and representations of the world is here put to further uses, this time to consider how we should classify such states as ‘fearing (or fearing for) fictional characters’. It is argued that these states have appropriateness conditions, just as fears for one’s friends and neighbours have. But the appropriateness conditions are very different and we are right to draw a distinction in kind between emotions directed at things assumed to be real and those ‘quasi-emotions’ directed at the avowedly fictional. Whether we say that these two kinds are both emotion-kinds, or instead that only one of them is strikes me as a less easily settled, less interesting, and possibly verbal question.
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