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Moral Psychology with Nietzsche$
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Brian Leiter

Print publication date: 2019

Print ISBN-13: 9780199696505

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2019

DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780199696505.001.0001

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Nietzsche’s Anti-Realism about Value

Nietzsche’s Anti-Realism about Value

The Explanatory Arguments

(p.17) 1 Nietzsche’s Anti-Realism about Value
Moral Psychology with Nietzsche

Brian Leiter

Oxford University Press

Nietzsche defends the metaphysical thesis that there are no objective (i.e. mind-independent) facts about values, including moral values. His primary arguments for his moral anti-realism are “best explanation” arguments: the best explanation of our moral judgments, indeed of the two-millennium long disagreements among moral philosophers, make no reference to objective moral facts. The details of an “inference to the best explanation” are laid out, and illustrated with Nietzsche’s own texts. Contemporary attempts to defend the explanatory role of moral facts are critiqued, and the radical implications of the argument from disagreement among philosophers considered and defended.

Keywords:   Moral anti-realism, inference to the best explanation, David Brink, Joshua Cohen, objectivity

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