Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Moral Psychology with Nietzsche$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

Brian Leiter

Print publication date: 2019

Print ISBN-13: 9780199696505

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2019

DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780199696505.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2022. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use.date: 05 July 2022

Nietzsche’s Theory of Agency

Nietzsche’s Theory of Agency

The Will and Freedom of the Will

(p.115) 5 Nietzsche’s Theory of Agency
Moral Psychology with Nietzsche

Brian Leiter

Oxford University Press

Nietzsche’s repudiation of free will and moral responsibility is documented throughout his corpus, and his arguments for this conclusion—arguments from his distinctive kind of fatalism, his skepticism about the causal efficacy of the will, and his particular brand of epiphenomenalism about the conscious mental states crucial to deliberation—are shown to undermine both compatibilist and incompatibilist views about free will and moral responsibility by engaging the views of many contemporary philosophers working on these topics, including Harry Frankfurt, Galen Strawson, Robert Kane, Derk Pereboom, Gary Watson, and others. In particular, the chapter argues that both “alternate possibilities” and “control” views of free will are vulnerable to Nietzsche’s critique. Some empirical evidence is adduced in support of Nietzsche’s view.

Keywords:   Compatibilism, incompatibilism, free will, fatalism, consciousness, epiphenomenalism, Mattia Riccardi, Paul Katsafanas, Daniel Wegner

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .