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Strategic Justice – Convention and Problems of Balancing Divergent Interests - Oxford Scholarship Online
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Strategic Justice: Convention and Problems of Balancing Divergent Interests

Peter Vanderschraaf

Abstract

This work presents a new analysis and evaluation, based upon an original game-theoretic analysis of convention, of the thesis that justice consists of systems of distinguished conventions. This thesis has ancient roots but has never been central in philosophy because convention itself has historically been so poorly understood. Given a sufficiently precise and general analysis of convention, the view that justice at bottom consists of conventions provides cogent answers to two perennial questions: (1) What is justice? (2) Why be just? Conventions are analyzed as correlated equilibria of games ... More

Keywords: convention, correlated equilibrium, circumstances of justice, cooperative surplus, justice as mutual advantage, Baseline Consistency, norms of fairness, state social contract, governing convention, Reconciliation Project

Bibliographic Information

Print publication date: 2018 Print ISBN-13: 9780199832194
Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2018 DOI:10.1093/oso/9780199832194.001.0001

Authors

Affiliations are at time of print publication.

Peter Vanderschraaf, author
Professor of Philosophy, University of California, Merced